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Abstract 
Starting from a review of models of positional and valence issues, the paper – by tapping into the 
original definition of valence issue – introduces a classification of issues based on their level of 
overall, dychotomic agreement. This allows the placement of both positional and valence issues on a 
same continuum. A second dimension is then introduced, which identifies how much specific issues 
are over- or undersupported within a specific party. A visual classification of issues based on these 
two dimensions (the AP diagram) is then introduced, highlighting risks and opportunities for a party in 
campaigning on specific issues. Specific indicators (namely, issue yield) and hypotheses derived from 
the AP model are tested on survey data from the EU Profiler project, which collected issue profiles of 
Internet users from the 27 EU Countries before the EP 2009 Elections. The results show that the 
suggested dimensions and indicators identify a wide cross-country and cross-issue variance. Also, 
indicators generated by the AP model are powerful predictors of issue saliency, even subsuming 
traditional Downsean indicators 
Keywords 
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Introduction* 
This paper is dedicated to the analysis of political issues, and to the introduction of a framework 
of analysis regarding how issues are employed in party competition. I suggest that an interest on 
political issues can be motivated with the intersection of two processes. On the one hand, the 
long-term modernization process of Western European countries has manifested itself, in the 
electoral arena, in terms of an overall individualization of the voting decision, where structural 
factors have a decreasing explanatory power; such process alone would leave room for an 
increasing role of political factors, namely the structure of the political alternatives that are 
presented to voters, as well as the strategies employed by the political actors that present them 
(see e.g. Thomassen 2005). 
On the other hand, this social process is complemented by a parallel change that has strongly 
affected political actors themselves. As highlighted by Bernard Manin (1997), processes of 
increasing international integration and interdependence (especially regarding the economy) have 
led to a de facto decrease of national autonomy in some policy sectors. This latter aspect has 
dramatic implications for political parties, as the limitation of national autonomy translates into a 
limitation of party autonomy for governing parties. It is hard to ignore that this puts into question 
one of the central mechanisms of party politics: the close link between policies proposed during 
the campaign and policies actually pursued once in office. In Manin’s conceptualization, this – 
along with the increasing mediatization of politics – is leading to a transition from party to 
“audience” democracy. In this new idealtype of democracy, parties are less able to realize, once 
in office, specific policies proposed to voters during the campaign; they instead have to face rapid 
changes in external conditions, thus being forced to employ their general ability and competence 
in handling the government rather than fulfilling specific policy commitments. 
The consequences of this transition for party competition are twofold, as we step back to the 
campaign period that precedes the elections. On the one hand, parties could be expected to 
downplay divisive issues in the campaign, especially in policy areas where external constraints 
will likely prevent strong action. As such, parties will probably insist more on their (and their 
leaders’) competence to handle the tasks of government. On the other hand, voters themselves 
will decreasingly rely on the traditional, divisive issues that used to structure party politics in the 
golden age of party democracy; they will increasingly focus on the evaluation of political 
leadership and competence, and of more subtle features of the political supply in general. 
The degree to which European democracies are moving towards this evolution (or whether they 
are doing so at all) is certainly questionable. Yet I suggest that it can be useful to provide 
conceptual tools that would allow measuring the evolution of this process. The goal of this paper 
is precisely to suggest possible conceptual tools for this task. 
In particular, the point of departure for this paper lies in the impressive similarity between the 
evolution envisaged by Manin and the model of party competition proposed – in the early Sixties 
– by Donald Stokes, which introduced the theorization of valence politics. The use of the valence 
framework for the analysis of recent developments of Western European countries is not new 
(e.g. Clarke et al. 2004, 2009). Yet this paper aims to provide an innovative conceptualization in 
this regard, based on the idea that positional and valence issues are not separate worlds, but are 
                                                     
* The research leading to this paper was made possible by the generous contribution of the Konstantinos G. 
Karamanlis Foundation. I wish to thank the European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) for making 
available data from the EU Profiler project: for a detailed presentation of the project, see Trechsel and Mair (2009). 
I also thank Nicola Malloggi for his contribution to the development of the AP diagram. 
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actually located on the same continuum; and that – due to this common nature – the role of issues 
for party competition can be understood with a single, more general approach. 
This paper tries to argument the usefulness of the proposed tools through the following steps. 
After this introduction, the first section presents a review of three existing views of political 
issues, while the second section presents the general features of the proposed unified 
conceptualization – along with measurement considerations – leading to the operational definition 
of specific indicators. The third section is the first devoted to empirical analysis: it describes some 
defining features of the issue spaces of the 27 EU countries, by applying the new indicators to 
data from the comparative EU-Profiler 2009 project. The fourth section uses the same indicators 
to develop a model of party competition in the same countries, in order to explain variance in 
issue emphasis by the various parties. Conclusions follow. 
1. Three views of political issues 
A review of possible conceptualizations of political issues cannot start without mentioning the 
spatial framework proposed by Downs (1957). In its original formulation, the Downsean model 
suggested that voting behavior and party competition could be modeled at once, with reference to 
a spatial metaphor. Upon specific assumptions1, the model hypothesized that parties would 
compete by changing their policy position: this dimensional motion (hence the sense of the spatial 
metaphor) would allow them to maximize votes by reaching the position of the median voter. The 
extension of such model to multiple dimensions eventually allowed even for the possibility of a 
Downsean framing of many political issues at the same time2. 
It could be said that the defining feature of the Downsean spatial framing is its focus on 
disagreement on policy alternatives. The spatial representation is a convenient metaphor for the 
presence of different preferences among voters regarding policy choices on a specific issue3: the 
fact that there is a voter distribution on the whole issue dimension implies that different policy 
choices are advocated within the electorate. In this case, spatial competition can take place, and 
parties – provided that the appropriate assumptions are met – will be rewarded by an increase of 
votes, as they move their proposed policy towards the equilibrium position (if such position 
exists)4. 
                                                     
1 Whose most important were: that there was a single dimension of conflict (which was identified as the left-right 
dimension, concerning the intervention of the state in the economy); that the preferences of voters were single-
peaked, so as to have a single preferred position for any voter on that dimension; that parties were only interested in 
the maximization of votes, and not in specific policy outcomes; that voters and parties had perfect information 
(Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook 1970). 
2 It must be noted, though, that this extension is far more problematic than could be expected, since Downs’ 
provision of a single dimension of conflict was purportedly meant as an assumption to avoid Condorcet’s paradox 
(Arrow 1951). A return to multiple dimensions (Davis and Hinich 1966; Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook 1970) 
brings Condorcet’s paradox back in, leading to the general absence of a single equilibrium point, unless under very 
demanding assumptions (Plott 1967). 
3 If we accept a Downsean framing of any political issue, leading to a multidimensional space posing the problems 
highlighted above. 
4 Empirical research has consistently shown that the predictive ability of the median voter theorem is quite limited 
(Fiorina 1974; Bullock and Brady 1983; Poole and Rosenthal 1984; Poole and Rosenthal 1985; Grofman, Griffin 
and Glazer 1990; Robertson 1976; Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987; Budge and Farlie 1977; Budge 1994; Budge 
et al. 2001; Adams 2001). This result even led neo-Downsean scholars to carefully state all the necessary 
conditions for the validity of the theorem, which were found so restrictive to conclude that “although there are 
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It is probably this focus on disagreement over policy choices that led Donald Stokes (Stokes 
1963) to introduce the valence issues framework, suggesting that not all political issues could be 
framed in spatial terms. By borrowing from social psychology5, he suggested that it would be 
perfectly possible to imagine a “condition that is positively or negatively valued by the 
electorate” (373), in terms of the electorate as a whole. It is not difficult to imagine such 
conditions: we could think about the frequency distributions we could get by adding to a 
questionnaire a standard Likert agreement/disagreement scale on statements such as “The country 
would greatly benefit from a foreign invasion” or “In general, economic prosperity is preferable 
to recession”. 
Stokes observed that issues such as these could definitely not be framed in terms of 
disagreement over policy choices. Yet such issues are strongly present in political campaigns6, 
therefore calling for an alternative conceptual framework. He suggested then that such specific 
valence issues, characterized by general agreement, led to a different mechanism of party 
competition. A party would not compete by changing its policy position7; it would instead 
compete by emphasizing (or hiding) the links between itself and specific conditions (valence 
issues) that are positively or negatively valued by the electorate; links that end up in attributing 
positive or negative valences to the party. As an example, a governing party in a period of 
economic success would clearly try to claim responsibility for this result, by trying to establish a 
link that would project on itself a positive valence on the issue of economic prosperity. In case of 
economic downturn, it would probably try to downplay its responsibilities in the handling of the 
economy. 
Therefore, competition on valence issues follows different mechanisms than on position 
issues. In particular, there are at least two differences to highlight. First, as it is clear in the 
definition of valence issue, the ability to establish links with imperative needs8 is clearly 
connected with the (perceived) competence of a party on a specific policy area: we could 
concisely say that, whereas competition on positional issues relies on policy positions, 
competition on valence issues relies on competence evaluations. This leads to a second 
consideration: while parties in general have (theoretically) full control over their policy position 
on an issue, they will have less control over their perceived competence. This latter stems from 
the reputation and credibility of parties: two features that are attributed by voters in response to 
party choices and behavior, not by a party itself. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
pressures in two-party competition for the two parties to converge, in general we should expect nonconvergence” 
(Grofman 2004). 
5 In particolar, from Kurt Lewin’s (1935) theory of personality, stating that the development of individual personality 
implies, at its very beginning, the attachment of positive or negative valences to objects (and other individuals) in 
the environment, based on the relation that the individual establishes between such objects and his imperative 
needs. 
6 For instance, in the 1952 U.S. presidential campaign example provided by the author. 
7 The absence of different policy alternatives is in the very definition of valence issue: “position-issues … involve 
advocacy of government actions from a set of alternatives over which a distribution of voter preferences is 
defined … valence-issues … merely involve the linking of the parties with some condition that is positively or 
negatively valued by the electorate” (Stokes 1963, 373). 
8 I refer to this term, analogous to Lewin’s original formulation, as a shorter expression for a condition that is 
positively or negatively valued by the electorate. In Lewin’s words, “the valence of an object usually derives from 
the fact that the object is a means to the satisfaction of a need, or has indirectly something to do with the 
satisfaction of a need” (1935, 78). For a discussion of the translation of the original German term 
Aufforderungcharakter (used by Lewin) to valence see Marrow (1969). Stokes himself later recognized that 
valence issue was an obscure terminological choice (Stokes 1992, 143). 
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But there is another crucial point that has been underemphasized by the literature that has 
(successfully) employed the valence framework. In Stokes’words, “the question whether a given 
problem poses a position- or valence-issue is a matter to be settled empirically and not on a priori 
logical grounds” (1963, 373). In other words, we cannot distinguish between position and valence 
issues based on theoretical considerations: in principle, any issue that is strongly divisive in a 
country could be completely uncontroversial in another. 
In this latter case, it would be a valence issue: in presence of a full agreement on a policy to be 
pursued, parties would compete by presenting themselves as more competent for pursuing it 
effectively, therefore following the typical pattern of valence competition9. As a consequence, it 
becomes a question of interest to determine the level of agreement on a specific issue in a specific 
campaign, possibly highlighting how issues that we traditionally consider as positional could 
reach levels of agreement that make them more similar to valence issues10. 
A third conceptualization of political issues could be said to borrow elements from both 
approaches. It is proposed in the saliency theory approach (Budge and Farlie 1983). At the core of 
this approach is the notion of selective emphasis: parties do not actually engage in a 
comprehensive debate which would require them to state their proposed policy options on all 
issues; they rather privilege only issues that they deem favorable to their party. 
But an even more insightful note emerges as the authors hypothesize what we could define a 
“second-stage” selective emphasis. Given that the issues examined are almost all divisive 
(therefore positional), it is clear that the policy space on such issues will imply inevitable trade-
offs. This “second stage” selective emphasis emerges as parties – once they choose an issue – will 
only highlight one side of the trade-off, by carefully hiding that an increase of a particular benefit 
will decrease another. For example, traditional leftist parties would emphasize their preference for 
a larger and better welfare state, but would never mention at all that it would imply higher taxes. 
Symmetrically, conservative parties would emphasize their promise of lower taxes, carefully 
hiding that this would imply a substantial reduction of welfare state provisions. 
A restatement of the saliency theory approach in Stokesian terms could claim that parties, by 
presenting voters only half of the actual issue, would try to transform positional, intrinsically 
divisive issues into conditions that are “positively valued” by the electorate, that is – valence 
issues. In this case, we should expect competence (rather than position) to become the main 
subject of competition. And this is precisely the key voting decision mechanism identified by 
Budge and Farlie: “party strategists assume … that electors make a clear connection between a 
certain party and good government performance on a particular issue” (25)11. Therefore, selective 
emphasis would be the tool that parties employ to activate a valence decision framework on an 
issue, in an attempt to escape the problematic tradeoffs implied by almost all policy choices. 
The three aforementioned approaches show that we can distinguish among two different 
conceptions of party competition on political issues (with the third being a combination of the 
two). The two look different in quality, as they imply different terms of choice (policy trade-offs 
                                                     
9 This feature of the valence model is clearly in line with Lewin’s statement that “The kind (sign) and strength of the 
valence of an object or event … depends directly upon the momentary condition of the needs of the individual 
concerned” (1935, 78). 
10 This point is developed in the next section. 
11 The cited statement (italics are mine) is at the core of the definition of issue ownership: parties can be said to own 
issues where they are generally perceived as more competent. It clearly evokes the valence framework: “good 
government performance” on a specific issue is definitely a non-positional, imperative need, that some parties are 
perceived to be able to fulfill more than others. 
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vs. imperative needs) and different competition tools for parties (position vs. reputation of 
competence). The saliency theory approach shows how one type of issue can be turned into the 
other only when it is strongly manipulated in its content (by actually removing half of the issue). 
In the next section I will suggest instead an approach where the two types of issues are 
different only in quantity, being located on the same continuum. In this case, we will be able to 
identify “intermediate”, quasi-valence issues combining the characteristics of both models. The 
key dimension for this framework will be the empirically-determined level of agreement 
envisioned by Donald Stokes in his original proposal. 
2. The agreement-partisanship framework 
In the previous section we have seen that, while most issues in most countries can be expected to 
be divisive (implying a positional competition framework), some of them – regarding conditions 
that are positively valued by the electorate – imply a different competition framework. 
But, in theory, nothing would prevent a traditionally positional issue (e.g. the trade-off 
between size of the welfare state and level of taxation) from having – in a particular campaign 
and in particular circumstances – an extremely skewed distribution. We could for example think 
of a Welfareland example, where 95% of citizens would be favorable12 to an increase in welfare 
state size – even with full knowledge that this would imply higher taxes. Or, on the other hand, 
we could imagine Freedomland citizens to be 95% favorable to a radical reduction of tax rates, 
even with full awareness that this would imply a drastic reduction in welfare services. 
How would party competition look like in these two countries? Changing a party’s position 
would have no effect, since there would not be any dimension to move on, given that almost the 
only viable policy would be the one advocated by 95% of citizens. In this case, this policy would 
become an imperative need, that is a condition positively valued by the electorate as a whole. 
Parties would try to present themselves as the most competent for achieving that goal – or they 
would try to downplay the issue, if they did not enjoy a good reputation on it. In other words, 
competition would take place according to the valence framework, despite the theoretically 
divisive nature of the issue. This is because the issue enjoys an extremely high level of 
agreement13. 
As a result, I suggest that, if we classify issues based on the level of agreement they enjoy in a 
specific electorate, both positional and valence issues can be placed on the same dimension. With 
“level of agreement” I suggest the simplest possible indicator: the percentage of citizens that lie 
on the “agreement” side of a scale measuring their position on a specific issue, regardless of the 
measurement scale14. 
A visual representation of the comparison between agreement and disagreement for several 
example issues is presented in Figure 1. At the leftmost extreme we find typical positional issues, 
which are strongly divisive in the electorate (a 50/50 balance). At the rightmost extreme there are 
instead typical valence issues, which are almost completely uncontroversial15. 
                                                     
12 Assuming a dychotomic measurement of an issue. 
13 This example shows that, as an alternative to the saliency theory approach, a positional issue can become a valence 
issue even without losing any part of its content, just because of the distribution of citizens’ preferences. 
14 This obviously poses problems for scales with an odd number of choices (that is, with a central, neutral position). 
15 Nothing would prevent us from measuring agreement on typical valence issues such as the provocative examples of 
the previous section. In this case we would expect to record almost 100% disagreement on the necessity of a 
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Figure 1 – The continuum connecting positional and valence issues 
But the most important point is that we can easily imagine issues that enjoy a high (though not 
complete) level of agreement. Such issues will lie at some place in the continuum. Some of those 
issues could even lie closer to idealtypical valence issues than to idealtypical positional issues: I 
suggest that these can be called quasi-valence issues. 
As an example, we can imagine a country with a two-party system, where a survey shows that 
a vast majority of citizens (say 80%) supports a strong promotion of renewable energies, even 
when this implies a rise in energy costs. It is clear that in this case positional competition will 
hardly take place, given that – within the electorate – the size of the issue space itself would be 
extremely restricted16. In this case the typical dynamics predicted by the valence approach (and 
by the saliency theory) would arise, with parties relying on their reputation of competence on the 
issue. 
Given the content of the issue, we could guess that it could be most easily owned by the leftist 
party. Therefore, it will try to focus its campaign on it, while the rightist party will try to 
downplay it as possible. A more rigorous empirical measurement would imply polling citizens 
about which party they consider more competent on the issue. Yet I suggest an easier approach 
(especially when party competence evaluations are not present in a survey) for measuring the 
attribution of competence to a party on a specific issue, as well as for assessing the presence of 
risks and opportunities for a party in campaigning on a specific issue. 
I suggest that, for this purpose, the agreement dimension can be complemented by the 
partisanship dimension, where this latter can be measured in terms of the presence of a relation 
between support for a party and support for a specific issue. This concept is best understood with 
reference to a dychotomized policy issue (agreement vs. disagreement) in the case of a two-party 
system: it is the case exemplified in Table 1. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
foreign invasion, and almost 100% agreement on the desirability of economic prosperity over recession. Still, 
policy alternatives could be defined on those issues as well. As an example, strong free-market supporters could 
advocate a lack of intervention in the recession, for it would imply a “natural selection” of more healthy companies. 
16 This does not prevent the existence of a much wider theoretical issue space (e.g. including the positions advocated 
by interest groups), yet with many positions not supported by the electorate. 
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The table exemplifies a situation of a left party with 45% support (e.g. voting intentions in a 
survey) and a rightist party with 55% support. In the same survey, a statement such as e.g. 
“Renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this means 
higher energy costs” enjoys a 80% level of support (respondents who agree with the statement). 
The table effectively summarizes the pattern of electoral risks and opportunities that such issue 
provides to the two parties. In particular, a key quantity of interest – for each party – is the level 
of differential support (over- or under-) compared to a null hypothesis of the issue being 
completely non-partisan. 
This level of differential support can be easily computed by comparing observed and expected 
frequencies in the two top cells. This is because expected frequencies are, by definition, the 
frequencies that we would observe if there were no relationship between being leftist (or rightist) 
and supporting the issue. Were there no relationship, the 45% of leftists would support the 
statement at the same ratio (80%) observed in the overall electorate, thus we should observe .45 
× .80 = .36 in the top left cell, and analogously .55 × .60 = .44 in the top right cell. We observe 
instead.45 and .35, which are respectively 9 points above and 9 points below the expected level of 
support. In other terms, this example issue is oversupported by 9 points within the left party, and 
undersupported by 9 points within the right party. 
Table 1 – Party support and agreement with “Renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar or 
wind energy) should be supported even if this means higher energy costs” in an example 
two-party system 
 Left Right Total 
Agrees with the statement .45 .35 .80 
Disagrees with the statement 0 .20 .20 
Total .45 .55  
Since it is easy to show that – in this two-party case – the two levels of differential support 
always have the same value with opposite sign, we can concentrate only on the top-right cell to 
summarize the whole relationship. This strong undersupport for the issue within the rightist party 
shows that the issue is strongly partisan: its support is strongly correlated with party support. 
All this information can be expressed in a visual representation that I will call the 
agreement/partisanship (briefly, AP) diagram. It is simply a two-dimensional plot of an arbitrary 
number of issues, where each issue has coordinates corresponding to its general level of 
agreement (on the y axis) and partisanship (on the x axis), where this latter is measured in terms 
of differential support in the top right cell. This diagram can also incorporate information 
regarding logical constraints for the maximum and minimum possible levels of partisanship, at 
any level of agreement17. An example AP diagram is shown in Figure 2, depicting the 
aforementioned “energy” issue along with two other example issues. 
                                                     
17 Such logical constraints can be easily identified. A first step is to identify the maximum and minimum possible 
values that we can observe in the top right cell. In this case, it is clear that we will never observe values above .55, 
since this is the level of support of the rightist party. There cannot be more rightist “welfarists” than there actually 
are rightists. For the same reasons, if the level of issue agreement were lower than .55 (the share of rightists), this 
would become a new upper limit, since there cannot be more rightist welfarists than welfarists tout court. 
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Let us first see how the visual features of the diagram express the connection between issue 
support an party support. First of all, the gray thicker lines are simply the visual representation of 
the maximum possible values for differential (over- or under-) support. Therefore, points 
representing issues (in short, issues) must lie within the diamond-shaped box. Given the equations 
of these lines18, it can be shown that the y coordinate of the right corner of the diamond 
corresponds to the level of support of the right party (.55), while the y coordinate of the left 
corner of the diamond corresponds to the level of support of the left party (.45)19. 
In theory, both parties could potentially be interested in campaigning on the energy issue, as it 
could provide new votes above their existing level of support. On the other hand, this issue 
clearly lies on the left border of the diamond. This simply means that it has the maximum possible 
level of undersupport within the right party (and, conversely) the maximum possible oversupport 
within the left party. From this analytical formulation we can derive, as it is clear in Table 1, a 
result that has crucial consequences in political terms: all leftist voters support the issue. 
It is clear that this latter formulation is much more interesting than the former, in political 
terms. For the leftist party there are no risks in campaigning on the issue since all its existing 
supporters already agree. But a campaign on this issue offers an opportunity for gaining new 
voters (potentially, up to the 80% that support the energy issue). 
This point is even clearer in the comparison with an example “devolution” issue. This latter 
issue offers less opportunities for new votes (it is supported “only” by 58% of voters), but – most 
importantly – presents serious risks for the leftist party, which are best understood by looking at 
the diagram.  
As the figure shows, the partisanship coordinate of this issue is 0. This has two implications: 
1) support for this issue is completely unrelated with party support (observed and expected 
frequencies are equal); 2) on the x axis the devolution issue is about 20 points above the 
minimum (the left boundary of the diamond), meaning that 20% within the leftist party (almost 
half of the party, since its whole support is 45%) does not support the issue20. Therefore, 
campaigning on devolution would be extremely risky for the leftist party. This makes the energy 
issue much more appealing, as it offers more opportunities, and no risks. 
The energy issue example is useful, as it highlights – by showing the properties of the 
boundary line – the connection between positional and valence issues, also allowing the 
placement of the saliency theory approach in the middle between the two. I would suggest that 
the boundary line is a privileged path for party competition. Let us see why. 
 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Regarding minimum possible values, we can quickly see that the observed .35 is already the minimum possible 
value. Even if all leftists support the issue, they are less than the overall support for the issue (.45 vs. .80), so there 
must be some rightist supporting the issue (at least .35, which is .80 – .45). We could only observe a value of 0 if 
leftists were at least as many as welfarists. In general, if we express support for the rightist party as p, support for 
the issue as i, and observed frequency in the top right cell as f (all expressed as proportions on the whole 
electorate), we can summarize the above as max(f) = min(i,p); min(f) = max(0, i – (1 – p)). 
18 See the Appendix. 
19 Such shape highlights the connection between agreement and partisanship of an issue: the more agreement there is 
an issue (widespread support), the less it can be partisan. 
20 If all leftists would support the issue, it would lie 20 points more on the left. 
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Figure 2 - AP diagram of an example two-party system with three issues 
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According to the very definition of the saliency theory, “[party leaders] seem to think that 
certain policy areas attract a net inflow of votes to the party when they become salient” (Budge 
and Farlie 1983, 24). Also, “party strategists assume … that electors make a clear connection 
between a certain party and good government performance on a particular issue” (25). 
In terms of “net inflow”, both the energy and devolution issues would provide a net inflow to 
the left party, for they could potentially raise its level of support to almost the same level. But 
regarding the connection between the party and a good performance on the issue, we could easily 
assume that the leftist party would be perceived as competent regarding the energy issue, and 
much less on the devolution issue21. Also, the increase of risks for parties of alienating existing 
                                                     
21 This assumption would be fully supported only with a more demanding condition: that all supporters of an issue 
also support this party. Nevertheless, the fact all supporters of a party support an issue (the case in Figure 2) can, in 
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supporters, when they campaign far from the boundary line, makes such line once more relevant 
for party competition strategies. 
Finally, the convergence of the two boundary lines (for these two example parties) at the 
100% agreement level shows the relationship between agreement and partisanship, and also how 
the shift from positional to valence issues can be seen as a continuous rather than as a discrete 
shift. As the issue agreement level increases, it is obvious that the partisanship of an issue will be 
constrained to decrease. If, in the same example two-party system, an issue is supported by 90% 
or 95% of the voters, it is inevitable that its can only have a very small partisan character (is so 
overwhelmingly supported by the electorate). And beyond this level we will find what could be 
called “pure” valence issues, which are supported by all voters. In this case, minimum and 
maximum partisanship will be constrained to be zero, leading to the impossibility to trace any 
connection between the issue and a particular party22. 
The features of the AP diagram generate clear hypotheses regarding party competition. We 
can expect that parties in general will try to privilege issues that are lying on (or extremely close 
to) their boundary line, as they will provide opportunities for vote gains, with zero or minimal 
risks of losing existing support. In the case of the rightist party, the “surveillance” issue (e.g. 
public incentives for private video surveillance cameras) could be a good candidate. Even though 
some rightist voters do not support the issue (it does not lie on the boundary line), the closeness 
of the issue to the boundary line still shows that the risk of losing existing supporters would be 
minimal, compared to the potential benefit. 
Before moving to the conclusion of this section, one last comment is needed, regarding the 
extension from the two-party to the multi-party case. In my view, the most simple and most 
effective approach is to apply the AP diagram to party-issue crosstabulations where the party is 
dichotomized in terms of one party vs. all the others. In this case, the interpretation for the two-
party case still holds, except for the fact that the term of comparison for a party is not its specific 
opponent (in a two-party system), but its generic opponent, in terms of what the party is not. In 
other words, while rightist strategists in a two-party system would deem an issue as “typically 
leftist”, this would not be applicable anymore in a multi-party system, as support for an issue 
could be asymmetrically split among several “non-rightist” parties23. 
I finally recapitulate the concepts introduced in this section and the connected hypotheses, in 
order to outline the structure of the empirical testing conducted in the next sections. 
1. A quantitative classification of issues is suggested, based on the agreement dimension, 
that allows to adopt a unified conceptualization encompassing positional and valence 
issues, by differentiating between them only in quantitative terms. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
my opinion, be employed as a good indicator that a party is perceived as competent on an issue, especially in 
absence of an explicit measurement of party competence. 
22 In this case, it becomes impossible to measure party competence with this method. 
23 In these terms, the difference is that the metric of the partisanship dimension is not anymore an absolute metric, 
encompassing all parties in a single, consistent system of coordinates, but rather a relative metric, assessing issues 
(and the distances between them and the party) in terms of the voters’ base (thus, the identity) of the party itself. It 
can be arguable whether other metrics can be preferred to this (such as issue spaces, or the left-right dimension). 
My point is that this metric has some desirable properties. First, it can easily and understandably depict an 
unlimited number of issues, without problems of multidimensionality. Secondly, it can estimate party-issue 
distances using simple, scalar values (see the next sections). This could be a property of the left-right dimension as 
well; but the AP diagram offers the additional advantage that – at the cost of being party-specific – it fully adopts 
the point of view of a specific party. In this regard, my view is that this can be an useful choice for evaluating party 
strategies. 
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2. A second quantitative criterion is introduced, based on the partisanship dimension. In 
conjunction with the former, this offers additional information, in terms of risks and 
opportunities that issues offer to parties. 
3. Regarding party strategies, I hypothesize that parties will privilege issues that maximize 
opportunities and minimize risks, therefore issues that lie as close as possible to their 
boundary line. 
In the following sections I will first explore an empirical application of the suggested 
classifications, and then move on the testing of hypothesis 3)24. 
3. Agreement and partisanship in the 2009 European elections 
This section moves to an empirical assessment of the suggested framework, by using data from 
the 2009 European Elections EU Profiler project. This dataset is peculiar, as the EU Profiler is a 
Voting Advice Application (VAA) that – during the election campaign – has collected more than 
2 million profiles of Internet users, based on items concerning 30 issues, in all the 27 EU states 
(plus 3 non-members, not analyzed here). 
Given the nature of VAAs, there is no real criterion of representativeness in the profiles 
provided. However, in this paper I will analyze a subsample of respondents25, weighted by their 
preferred party26, in order to have distributions on this variable match the final election result in 
each country. As such, despite the inability to draw rigorous inferences from this sample, it can 
serve as a useful test case, especially due to the numerous issues present in the EU Profiler 
questionnaire. The analysis is based on 28 of the 30 issues included in the questionnaire: it 
excludes the 2 country-specific issues. Actual item wordings are reported in the Appendix. 
3.1. Issue agreement 
The first question of interest is whether the proposed classification based on agreement makes 
sense empirically. Do we observe substantial variance in terms of agreement across issues and 
across countries? Are there really issues that enjoy a very high level of agreement, so that they 
can be considered as quasi-valence issues? 
                                                     
24 In this paper I do not fully explore other possibilities that are offered by this conceptualization and its dimensions 
of analysis. From the characterization of issues and party-issue relationships (in terms of agreement and 
partisanship), many other characterizations can emerge, regarding either parties or issues alone. In the former case, 
parties in multiparty systems can be characterized in terms of how much their based is polarized on issues (that is, 
whether they are issue parties or not), in terms of the distribution of their partisanship on several issues, e.g. 
weighted by the salience they assign to specific issues. Such indices could be also summarized at the national level, 
thus allowing comparisons of party systems in terms of issue polarization. Analogue criteria could be employed for 
issues, in terms of their being cross-cutting or party-related. Many other examples can be suggested. 
25 At most 2000 respondents were included for each country (or area, in those countries that were divided in more 
than one area, based on linguistic or party system criteria). See the Appendix. 
26 The preferred party variable was coded based on answers to a battery of PTV (propensity to vote) questions. 
Respondents giving a party a score above all others were coded as preferring that party. In order to maximize valid 
values, the preferred party was coded also for other respondents, using the following imputation procedure. The 
just-computed party preference was modeled with a binary logistic regression model including all PTVs, all party-
respondent spatial distances, all party-respondent levels of issue agreement, all party-respondent levels of issue 
agreement weighted with respondent-level issue saliency. Predicted probabilities from this model were used to 
decide ties in PTVs and impute preferred parties. For respondents that did not answer PTV questions, the same 
procedure was repeated, removing PTVs from the independent variables in the model. See the Appendix. 
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Table 2 presents empirical evidence regarding such questions in the 27 EU countries, by 
reporting summary statistics for the level of agreement registered for each issue in each country27. 
The first two columns present, for each issue, the mean and the standard deviation of the 27 levels 
of agreement measured at the country level28. 
It is first clear that there is a substantial amount of cross-issue variation. Despite being the 
mean of 27 countries, values in the first column exhibit wide variance, ranging from a 0.33 
supporting the bailout of failing banks with public money to 0.82 claiming that the country is 
much better off in the EU than outside it. 
Coming to the empirical existence of quasi-valence issues, I suggest that an empirical 
definition can adopt a threshold of 75% agreement (or disagreement, that is, 25% agreement) to 
establish that an issue becomes less controversial, so as to foster the emergence of mechanisms 
that are typically observed on valence issues29. 
Based on this definition, the concept is already relevant at the aggregate EU level. Even 
considering the mean of the levels of agreement in the 27 EU countries, there are some issues 
where such mean is above 0.75: support for renewable sources (even implying higher energy 
costs), development of an EU common foreign policy, support for EU integration, and the 
perception that the country is better off in the EU than outside. It is remarkable that among these 
statements there are some that are expressed in terms that clearly imply a trade-off, or that link to 
inherently controversial issues. In other words, even these first EU-level means already show that 
it is not necessary that a controversial issue be deprived of half of its meaning, in order to reach 
the very high level of agreement of a quasi-valence issue30. 
This point becomes even clearer as we examine the third and fourth columns, which also give 
a clear answer in terms of cross-country variation. These columns report the counts, for each 
issue, of how many are the countries where this issue has level of agreement above 75% or below 
25%. These counts clearly show that the concept of quasi-valence issue has a relevant discerning 
capacity: there is a clear presence of such issues in EU countries. Actually, each of the 28 issues 
is a quasi-valence issue in at least one country (counting both agreement and disagreement). This 
also applies to issues that are very divisive at the EU level, with overall means close to 0.5. There 
is even the case of the reduction of farmers’subsidies, which is a quasi-valence issue in two 
opposite directions, respectively in Bulgaria (disagreement) and Denmark (agreement). 
Therefore, I would suggest that a classification of issues based on their level of agreement can 
make sense empirically, as it allows to highlight a substantial amount of variance, both across 
issues and across countries. Quasi-valence issues exist; they are not a tautological concept, as 
they are radically different in different countries, so that they can be succesfully used to 
characterize the issue space of a specific country. 
                                                     
27 All issues are measured using a standard 5-position Likert scale, which included a “neutral” central position. I 
operationalize agreement by first dichotomizing each issue (0=agree, 1=disagree), and then computing the country-
level mean. Neutral values, rather than discarded, are coded as 0.5, with the effect of shrinking the levels of 
agreement or disagreement towards 0.5. This gives a conservative measure of the presence of quasi-valence issues. 
28 Levels of agreement for all issues in all countries are reported in the Appendix. 
29 This threshold can be justified as it splits the continuum shown in Figure 1 in two symmetric regions. Issues with 
agreement above 75% are closer to typical valence issues than they are to typical positional issues. 
30 One exception to this feature is the “increase creches” issue, whose wording did not link to any specific trade-off. 
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Table 2 - Level of agreement on issues in the 27 EU countries 
  
Agreement in the EU countries 
(N=27)  N countries where…
    mean SD  >= 0.75 <= 0.25 
1 keep welfare 0.64 0.11  4 0 
2 privatise healthcare 0.35 0.10  0 3 
3 increase creches 0.73 0.12  15 0 
       
4 attract skilled immigrants 0.64 0.10  2 0 
5 restrict immigration 0.56 0.11  1 0 
6 immigrants accept values 0.72 0.10  8 0 
       
7 same sex marriages good 0.57 0.16  2 0 
8 more respect for religion 0.38 0.12  0 5 
9 legalise soft drugs 0.44 0.09  0 2 
10 legalise euthanasia 0.66 0.10  3 0 
       
11 reduce govt spending 0.67 0.12  7 0 
12 tax powers for EU 0.36 0.12  0 6 
13 bail out banks 0.33 0.10  0 7 
14 reduce workers' protection 0.37 0.08  0 1 
15 reduce farmers' subsidies 0.48 0.14  1 1 
       
16 support renewable sources 0.77 0.09  16 0 
17 promote public transport 0.65 0.11  5 0 
18 fight global warming 0.62 0.12  2 0 
       
19 restrict civil liberties 0.36 0.09  0 3 
20 more severe punishments 0.75 0.09  15 0 
       
21 EU one voice 0.79 0.08  20 0 
22 strengthen EU defence 0.71 0.08  10 0 
23 EU integration good 0.80 0.07  22 0 
24 country better in the EU 0.82 0.08  23 0 
25 enlarge EU to Turkey 0.37 0.08  0 3 
       
26 more powers to EP 0.58 0.13  3 0 
27 less veto power for EU states 0.55 0.12  2 0 
28 referendum for new treaties 0.57 0.09  2 0 
3.2. Issue partisanship 
Coming to this second dimension, it must be first highlighted that it presents an additional level 
of complexity, since it regards not only issues, but issues * parties relationships. As such, it lends 
itself less to a direct presentation, unless some summary measures are introduced. I will focus on 
what can be defined as the overall issue polarization of a specific party. This indicator is best 
understood by referring to two empirical examples of AP diagrams, based on the EU Profiler 
dataset. 
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Figures 3 and 4 show the AP diagrams for PDL (Romania) and PSOE (Spain). Both diagrams 
share the same scale, and can then be directly compared31. For now, there is only one aspect of 
the diagrams that is relevant: the distance of issues from the central line of no partisanship. 
It is clear that supporters of the PDL are not strongly different from the whole Romanian 
sample in terms of their agreement/disagreement on specific issues. Levels of differential support 
within the PDL are extremely low, meaning that the observed support is very close to the 
expected support under the null hypothesis. The situation is clearly different as we examine the 
PSOE: on many issues, support for the issue within PSOE supporters is strongly different from 
the mean levels of the whole sample. Differential support is clearly present. 
A possible way to summarize these levels of differential support (partisanship) requires first to 
derive some relative measure of differential support that is independent of the overall level of 
agreement on an issue. This is because, as clear from the boundary lines shown in the diagram, an 
issue with 0.9 agreement will have a maximum possible partisanship that is much lower, 
compared to an issue with 0.5 agreement. Thus, the level of differential support for an issue (in 
absolute value) can be divided by its possible maximum (at its specific level of agreement), thus 
obtaining a relative index, always in the 0-1 range, regardless of the level of issue agreement. 
This relative differential support expresses how much an issue is over- or undersupported within a 
party, relatively to the maximum possible value. An issue on the central no-partisanship line will 
score 0; an issue on the boundary line will score 1. 
Figure 3 - AP diagram for the PDL (Romania) - overall issue polarization is 0.09 
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31 The different width of the two charts is the consequence of using the same scale: since the two parties are of 
different size, their maximum possible level of differential support is different. 
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Figure 4 - AP diagram for the PSOE (Spain) - overall issue polarization is 0.42 
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This measure can finally be averaged for all issues in a specific party32. This measure of issue 
polarization in a party will tell us how much, on average, issues enjoy differential support within 
a party. This index of issue polarization in the two latter examples assumes the values of 0.09 and 
0.42 respectively, effectively capturing the differences between the two parties. 
A very brief summarization of this variable is through the results of a multivariate analysis. In 
this case, on a matrix of 268 cases (parties within countries), I estimated a two-level model 
(parties nested within countries) of issue polarization of a party, based on party size and EU party 
family33. Also, cross-country variation is indirectly reported by the standard deviation of the 
constant across countries. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3. 
Compared to a two-level null-model, the amount of variance explained by party size and party 
family is remarkable, as the two variables account for about 25% of the variance34. The first result 
is that larger parties (despite the PSOE example) tend to have lower levels of overall issue 
                                                     
32 The choice to summarize on parties rather than on issues is motivated by the results of a variance-components 
analysis, whose results (not reported here) show that there is much more variation among parties than among 
issues. In other words, it’s not issues that differ in how much they are correlated to parties; it is parties that differ in 
how much they have an issue-polarized voter base.  
33 Coded as follows: EPP-ED (centre-right), PES (centre-left), ALDE (liberal), UEN (national-conservative), G-EFA 
(greens), GUE-NGL (far left), ID (eurosceptic), all other parties. This last category was omitted from the analysis, 
serving as a reference category. 
34 R-squared is seldom reported in multi-level analyses. Yet its definition still applies to multi-level models, provided 
that the appropriate model is chosen for comparison. As in one of the possible definitions, values of R-squared 
reported here are based on the computation of the sum of squared residuals for a null model (the reference) and the 
full model. 
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polarization: their voter’s base tends to be less strongly connotated on issues, compared to smaller 
parties. 
Secondly, EU party family seems to be relevant for predicting how much a party’s voter base 
will be polarized on issues. Parties belonging to EPP and ALDE have levels of polarization that 
are significantly lower than average; PES and UEN members are not significantly different, while 
parties belonging to Greens-EFA, GUE-NGL and Eurosceptic groups have levels of issue 
polarization that are significantly higher35. In this case, the presence of moderate or extreme 
positions on the left-right continuum could certainly be an underlying explanatory factor. 
Table 3 - Effects of party size and party family on the issue polarization of a party's voter 
base, (two-level, country-party model) 
  b se 
party size -0.168** (0.063) 
   
EPP -0.061** (0.019) 
PES -0.027 (0.021) 
ALDE -0.054** (0.020) 
UEN -0.022 (0.027) 
Greens-EFA 0.058** (0.021) 
GUE-NGL 0.061** (0.021) 
Eurosceptic 0.105** (0.032) 
   
Constant 0.310*** (0.013) 
SD of the constant among countries 0.033  
   
R2 vs. a hierarchical null model 
(countries)  0.255 
R2 vs. a EU-wide null model  0.416 
N (parties within countries) 268 
Finally, constants for individual countries are not widely dispersed, having a standard deviation 
of 0.033. This, in conjunction with the previous result (see note 33), seems to show that parties 
and their specific left-right positions are more relevant in influencing issue polarization than the 
issue content itself. 
4. Testing hypotheses on party competition 
Let us come finally to the empirical testing of the hypothesis on party competition that was 
introduced at the end of section 1. There I suggested that parties will privilege issues that offer 
opportunities at the lowest possible risks, therefore issue that lie as close as possible to the 
boundary line. And this not only derives from a minimization of risks, but from the assumption 
that the strong (or even full) support of an issue within a party can suggest that the party actively 
owns the issue (thus, being perceived as competent on it). 
So, in principle, the distance from the boundary line could be the independent variable whose 
effect we would like to test. Yet, it can be hard to expect that, by campaigning on a specific issue, 
                                                     
35 Party size is controlled for, as it is included in the model. 
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a party will be able to secure the support of all voters that support the issue. We can rather 
hypothesize that only some of these voters will probably turn their attention to the party, possibly 
changing their vote choice. This means that the potential future electorate of the party will not 
become equivalent to the electorate that supports the issue: it will only become a little closer to it. 
In geometrical terms, we can translate this hypothesis into a shift of the location of the party. 
If successful, the party will move closer to the location of the issue, on the line that connects the 
two locations. If a party could reduce, through the years, its whole identity to this single issue 
(and if voters would vote on this issue alone), we could in theory hypothesize that the party’s 
electorate would finally land in this new location. 
Thus, a campaign on an issue envisions a move of the party, on the line that connects its 
location to the location of the issue. A relevant consequence of this is that what matters most is 
not the overall level of agreement of an issue or, simply, the distance of an issue from the 
boundary line (both measure only the final destination). What matters most is the slope of the 
party-issue line. The more the slope is close to the slope of the boundary line, the less the party 
will have to move away from its voters36, regardless of its final destination. 
So the key independent variable whose influence will be tested will be the relative slope of the 
party-issue line. The term relative tells that the simple, geometric slope of this line is divided by 
its maximum possible value (the slope of the boundary line). As such, this relative indicator – 
graphically exemplified in Figure 5 – will be 1 when an issue is on the boundary line, and will be 
0 when a party moves towards an issue that has the same level of support, (with a loss of some of 
its original voters). For the sake of brevity, I will define this relative index as the issue yield. This 
term expresses the potential gains of campaigning on an issue. An issue with yield=1 is 
characterized by only potential gains, without losses. Issues with lower values imply less 
potential gains.  
The issue yield can be easily computed for any party-issue pair. If we define p as the share of 
respondents that support a party, i the share of respondents that agrees on an issue, and f the share 
of respondents that support the party and agree on the issue, it can be shown37 that issue yield is: 
))1((
)(
ippf
ippL +−+
−=
                                                     
36 This virtue of the boundary line echoes the mechanism envisioned by Stokes regarding valence issues: “Part of the 
appeal of valence-campaigning to the electoral strategists is that an artfully chosen valence issue need not cost any 
votes” (Stokes 1992, 158). 
37 See the Appendix.  
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Figure 5 - Lines with different values of issue yield in the PSOE example 
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Coming to the dependent variable, an ideal choice would be to use issue saliency information 
derived from manifesto or media data. Yet this choice is not possible, as such data is not available 
for the 2009 EP elections for all countries involved. Also, such choice would probably create 
serious problems due to the unrepresentativeness of the sample. It could be likely that the salience 
hierarchies of the parties would not necessarily apply to the perceived saliency in the analyzed 
sample. This is why I necessarily have to recur to perceived saliency38. As such, the dependent 
variable is the perceived saliency of an issue within strong supporters of a party, under the 
assumption that this perceived saliency will be highly correlated with the saliency assigned by the 
party in its communication. 
The analysis is structured as follows. The dataset includes 5956 cases (parties * issues). First, 
rival multivariate three-level models of issue saliency are tested, comparing L with other 
indicators of issue opportunities and risks, in order to test whether L really conveys more 
information than simpler measures. Secondly, the resulting model will be compared with a rival 
                                                     
38 The operationalization of perceived saliency is based on the following procedure, given that profiles in the EU 
Profiler dataset also included saliency assessments of all issues at the individual level. First, within all party 
supporters, a smaller base of strong supporters was identified: only respondents who assigned a PTV of 10 to only 
one party. Then, for all supporters of a party, the mean of the logs of the perceived saliency was computed. Logs 
are used because respondents were presented three choices (“-”, “=”, “+”), coded respectively as 0.5, 1 and 2. This 
final mean of the logs – the log of the average perceived saliency of the issue for party supporters – is the 
dependent variable. 
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model derived from the spatial Downsian model: that parties campaign on issues where their 
position is closer to that of the median voter39. Finally, some relevant interactions will be 
discussed. 
The first step of the analysis is to set up a baseline model, to serve as a reference for 
subsequent models including more variables. The baseline model is a three-level model where the 
lowest-level observations (party-issue pairs) are nested within issues, which are in turn nested 
within countries40. Party size and EU party family are incorporated as control variables. 
The results are presented in Table 4. This first model shows that the hierarchical structure of 
the data already accounts for an important portion of the variance observed in issue saliency. 
Compared to a EU-wide null model41, the hierarchical null model already shows an R-squared of 
0.434 (AIC= –514.39, BIC= –487.62, with N=5956), meaning that country heterogeneity, issue 
heterogeneity and their combination alone account for about 43% of the observed variance in 
issue saliency. However, subsequent models will take this hierarchical null model as a reference, 
rather then the EU-wide null model. Using this new reference, which I will later refer to as model 
0, the above control variables (party size and family) lead to an initial R-squared of only 0.004, 
showing very small significant effects. 
The first question that I want to address regards the usefulness of issue yield L as an indicator, 
compared to i and f. As noted above, the definition of L, derived from logical and graphical 
considerations, provides a complex, non-linear combination of p, i, and f. In order to determine 
whether this complexity is worth the effort, I compare two rival models. Model A is simply 
model 0 (which already includes p) plus i and f; thus it expresses the information contained in a 
linear combination of p, i, and f. Model B is instead model 0 plus L; it expresses the information 
contained in a specific non-linear combination of p, i, and f (the definition of L). The results of 
the comparison of these two models (along with another model discussed later) are also presented 
in Table 4. 
The results of the comparison show that the logical information contained in the definition of 
L adds a significant amount of knowledge regarding the empirical data in the analyzed sample. L 
conveys substantially more information than the simple linear combination of p, i, and f: 
compared to the reference model including only the control variables, model B explains an 
amount of variance that is significantly higher than model A (R-squared of 0.234 compared to 
0.076).  
                                                     
39 To some extent, this can be seen as a hypothesis that cannot be derived from the Downsian model in a multiparty 
system, since the median voter theorem is no longer valid in such a system. Yet it is still possible that the structure 
of specific issue dimensions – taken one at the time – presents distributions of voters (and party positions) that can 
still be analyzed according to the median voter hypothesis. 
40 The reverse nesting order yields very similar results, yet with a slightly lower amount of variance explained.  
41 Where the saliency of each issue is predicted with the grand mean of the saliencies of all issues in all countries. 
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Table 4 - Comparison of rival models of issue emphasis 
b se b se b se b se
p (party size)
party family
L (issue yield) 0.684*** (0.017) 0.658*** (0.018)
i (issue agreement) 0.185*** (0.030)
f (share supporting the party and the issue) 1.896*** (0.092)
d (Downsean, party-median voter distance) -.0633*** (0.012)
Constant at the lowest level 0.203*** (0.009) 0.104*** (0.020) -0.191*** (0.013) -0.156*** (0.014)
SD of the constant at the issue level
SD of the constant at the country level
AIC
BIC
R2 vs. the hierarchical null model
R2 vs. the EU-wide null model
N
0.018 0.014
0.565
5956
0.023
-1824.19
-1730.50
0.151
0.013
Model CModel B
(omitted)
(omitted)
0.147
0.232
0.436
5956 59565956
0.566
0.234
Base model
-462.18
-381.88
0.004
(omitted)
(omitted)
0.151 0.132
-1064.53
-970.84
0.477
0.076
Model A
-1810.08
-1723.08
(omitted)
(omitted)
(omitted)
(omitted)
 
As a result, I suggest that L can be considered, compared to i and f, as a more useful predictor of 
the salience that a party will assign to a particular issue: a predictor that performs much better 
than, simply, the overall agreement on the issue (i), combined with the level of support for the 
issue within the party (f). This first result acts as a confirmation that a unified conceptualization 
of issues implying the AP diagram has useful implications for the analysis of party competition. 
But this result can be confirmed even more strongly, as we try to compare Model B with a 
model that includes features related to the traditional, Downsean spatial model of party 
competition. Model C includes an additional variable d, which is based on the comparison 
between the position adopted by the party on the specific issue42, and the position of the median 
voter on the issue, in that specific country. The hypothesis underlying this choice is that a party 
enjoying a Downsean advantage on a particular issue should have an incentive in emphasizing it 
during the campaign, as it could result in an electoral benefit. The negative effect estimated for 
variable d in model C confirms this hypothesis: the lower the distance from the median voter, the 
higher the emphasis of the party on the issue. Yet there are two aspects that are perhaps 
surprising. The first is that the effect is small, amounting to less than one tenth of the effect of L. 
The second, closely connected to the first, is that the addition of d does not increase the amount of 
variance explained by the model43. In other words, Downsean information about this party-issue 
relationship does not add anything to our prediction of issue saliency, once that L is already in the 
model. 
This result must not be misinterpreted, by concluding that positional competition has no 
relevance in the sample examined. This is because L already subsumes a vast amount of 
positional information about the party and its relationship with the issue. L still expresses spatial 
information, regarding the closeness of the party to the issue, though in a metric that is not 
coincident with the specific issue dimension. Yet such metric still has features that are inherently 
                                                     
42 In the EU Profiler project, parties were asked to declare their positions on all issues. Where parties failed to do so, 
their positions were coded based on manifesto and media data. 
43 AIC and BIC report a slight improvement in the model, while R-squared becomes actually a little lower. 
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positional, because the extent to which supporters of the party overlap with supporters of the issue 
(what is actually expressed by L) is a piece of strongly positional information44. The correct 
interpretation of the result is thus that L also conveys spatial information, and in this regard is still 
suggests that a unified conceptualization can make sense: the information provided in the AP 
diagram is able to summarize both positional and quasi-valence features determining issue 
emphasis. 
It is now of interest to examine a final model, which does not include the above alternative 
indicators for the aforementioned reasons, but rather specifies with more detail the influence of L, 
by including its interactions with some key variables. These variables are the following: issue 
agreement i (along with its main effect), party size p and party family. This last model, presented 
in Table 5, finally lends itself to a substantive discussion. 
The first result is that the main hypothesis emerging from the AP diagram is confirmed. L has 
a large, significant effect, meaning that parties place a higher emphasis on issues that lie closer 
to the boundary path. As we have seen previously, this criterion outperforms both spatial features 
such as the closeness of the party position on the issue to the median position, and other features 
such as the general agreement on the issue, or the amount of support for the issue within the 
party. 
Yet this general result can be further specified, as we examine the interactions that several 
other variables have with this explanatory factor45. In general, I suggest that interactions with L 
should be interpreted as different competitive attitudes regarding the use of political issues in 
campaigns. A positive interaction with L (thus, a higher slope of L) should suggest a more 
aggressive campaign style, where the presence of potentially more productive issues is more 
actively exploited by a party. On the opposite, a negative interaction (thus, a lower slope of L) 
would suggest a more conservative style, where party management is ignoring to a larger extent 
the presence of issues that could have a higher yield. 
The first variable I examine is party family. Do different party families adopt different 
strategies towards the use of high-yield issues in their campaign? The results show that there is a 
positive answer to this question: some party families are differentiated in this regard, to a 
statistically significant extent. Compared to the reference category (other, unclassified parties) the 
two largest party families (EPP and PES) do not show a significantly higher sensitivity to issue 
yield; this also applies to the GUE-NGL family46. All other families show instead a more 
aggressive style, placing even higher saliency on higher-yield issues. This applies, in order of 
strength of effect, to the ALDE (.082*), to the Greens-EFA (.104**), to the UEN (.123*), and 
most notably to the Eurosceptic category (.168*). These are parties which show a sensitivity to 
issue yield that is higher than average. 
                                                     
44 It is true, however, that the positional information subsumed in L is simplified, since positions are only coded as 0, 
0.5 or 1 in the original computation of i. 
45 Except obviously for L, I omit the actual coefficients for the constitutive terms (main effects). Brambor, Clark, and 
Golder (2006) suggest that the correct interpretation of such constitutive terms is not as a main unconditional effect, 
but simply the effect of the variable when the other interacting variable is 0. According to this interpretation, the 
values of such terms simply confirm the interpretation that I will provide for the specific interactions. This is even 
more strongly confirmed by the fact that in the base model shown before, where party size and family where 
included without interactions and without information on issues, such main unconditional terms had no almost no 
significant effect. The actual coefficients omitted from Table are: party size 0.799*** (0.063); EPP -0.058** 
(0.021), PES -0.053* (0.022), ALDE -0.104*** (0.023), UEN -0.078* (0.031), Greens-EFA -0.106*** (0.023), 
GUE-NGL -0.042 (0.024), Eurosceptic -0.113** (0.037); issue agreement -1.153*** (0.055). 
46 Such effects cannot be spurious effects of party size, which is already controlled for. 
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Table 5– Three-level random-intercept model of issue emphasis, based on L and its 
interactions with various variables 
  b se   
p (party size) (omitted)  
party family (omitted)  
i (issue agreement) (omitted)  
    
L 0.420*** (0.074)  
    
L * EPP 0.054 (0.036)  
L * PES 0.025 (0.037)  
L * ALDE 0.082* (0.039)  
L * UEN 0.123* (0.053)  
L * Greens-EFA 0.104** (0.038)  
L * GUE-NGL 0.037 (0.041)  
L * Eurosceptic 0.168* (0.066)  
    
L * party size -0.566*** (0.104)  
    
L * i 0.998*** (0.096)  
    
Constant at the lowest level 0.267*** (0.033)  
SD of the constant at the issue level  0.130   
SD of the constant at the country level  0.020     
    
AIC -2301,47   
BIC -2147,55   
    
R2 vs. the hierarchical null model 0,279   
R2 vs. the EU-wide null model 0,592   
N 5956     
The second examined interaction is party size. The effect for this interaction is even stronger than 
the main effect of L, and highly significant. A first look at the coefficient simply suggests that 
larger parties pay much less attention to issue yield, and that this effect could even nullify the 
effect of L, so as to make large parties completely indifferent to issue yield. It must be noted, 
though, that the two variables have different empirical ranges. In the observed sample, issue yield 
has values in all the theoretically possible 0-1 range (we already saw some examples in the 
previous figures); on the contrary, party size (measured as party share, so in the 0-1 range), has 
almost no values above 0.5, and it is even theoretically difficult to imagine a vote share above 
0.6-0.7 at the national level in Europe. It then makes sense to interpret the interaction by referring 
to example values corresponding to meaningful party shares. In this case, the interaction 
coefficient tells us that, if we examine two parties (of the same party family) obtaining 
respectively 10% and 40% of votes, the sensitivity to the yield of the same issue will be 0.17 
lower (-.566 * 0.3, where this latter term is the difference in vote share between the two parties). 
The estimated effect, then, is much weaker than it appears from the coefficient. 
This latter claim is even more strongly supported by the examination of the last coefficient, 
which shows the interaction between issue yield and issue agreement. This coefficient could be 
interpreted as the increase in emphasis for two issues that lie on the same party-issue line, yet 
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with different levels of overall agreement. The effect is extremely strong, providing a 
confirmation for the quasi-valence issue model of party competition. Not only parties place 
higher saliency on issues that lie on their boundary line (these issues avoid any risk of losing 
existing supporters), but – among these latter –they will place more saliency on issues that enjoy 
a higher agreement in the whole electorate. 
It must be then noted that this final model reaches a remarkable amount of variance explained, 
showing that the information summarized in the AP diagram captures a substantial amount of 
variation in issue emphasis. 
Also, in my opinion the analysis also suggests some remarks regarding the substantive results. 
In general terms, the substantive conclusions suggested by the model do not seem theoretically 
implausible, despite the strongly non-representative nature of the analyzed sample and the 
arguable use of perceived saliency. These caveats specified, the results of the model are not far 
from reasonable expectations. The advantages provided by high-yield issues seem to exert a 
significant effect on issue saliency, with the moderating role of party family and party size, and 
an additional interaction of general issue agreement. 
The result that large parties have a campaign style that is less aggressive than small parties is 
consistent with the literature highlighting the natural pressure for parties to cooperate rather than 
compete, especially when they have a large, stable parliamentary presence and frequent 
opportunities to assume government responsibilities. This latter aspect could also easily justify a 
more conservative approach, due to the presence of much more stable links with interest groups. 
It would be no wonder then, that – despite its very high yield – a large, governing party could 
perfectly ignore the energy issue, given that an emphasis on it would endanger relationships with 
important interest groups. And conversely it would be no wonder that a small, aggressive Green 
party would build its whole campaign on it. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper started by suggesting how two rival frameworks for the analysis of political issues (in 
the context of party competition) could potentially be encompassed in a single, overarching 
(necessarily more general) conceptualization. Such new framework is not abstract or generic, as it 
is able to derive specific empirical predictions about the saliency that parties assign to issues 
during their campaign. 
First, all conclusions based on the presented evidence have to be framed in the context of a 
non-representative sample. Nevertheless, one of the main results that I would like to stress is 
about the presence of variance, which is the first important test when testing indicators, and 
which could hardly – in my opinion – be considered as an artifact of a non-representative sample. 
In this regard, the conclusions are encouraging. 
On the agreement dimension, issues show an interesting amount of both cross-country and 
cross-issue variance. Quasi-valence issues exist, as several issues have very high level of 
agreement; and their presence is distributed across different issue areas and political orientations 
(from renewable energies to tough attitudes on crime, etc.). Regarding the partisanship 
dimension, there is also substantial variance, as different parties show marked differences in how 
their voters differentially support specific issues. Predictors of the issue polarization of parties 
show results that could be substantively expected: party family and size have a relevant influence 
on the issue polarization of a party. 
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Coming to the specific indicator deriving from the AP diagram – issue yield – there are first 
some conceptual remarks. In general terms, issue yield outperforms alternative indicators of the 
features reported in the AP diagram, showing that the specific information introduced by the 
diagram is empirically relevant. Also – in rival model testing – it drastically reduces the influence 
of traditional Downsian predictors, showing that the concept of issue yield actually subsumes 
information regarding both the positional and the valence aspects of issue competition. 
Finally, the main hypothesis deriving from the AP diagram – that higher-yield issues will be 
more salient – is substantially confirmed by the analysis: parties supporters perceive as more 
salient issues that have a higher issue yield. Under the assumption that the saliency hierarchy of 
party supporters mirrors the hierarchy introduced by party strategists, we can derive a partial 
confirmation of the hypothesis that issue yield is a good predictor for issues that will be selected 
during a campaign. 
Therefore, in my opinion, the results presented show that the AP framework could prove 
useful in empirical analysis. Further confirmation of these results is definitely needed on more 
representative datasets: yet I would conclude that the concepts introduced can serve as useful 
guides for empirical analysis. 
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6. Appendix 
Table 1 - Actual wording of the 28 EU Profiler issues included in the analysis 
1 Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes 
2 Greater efforts should be made to privatise healthcare services in [country] 
3 State subsidies for crèches and child care should be increased substantially 
  
4 Immigration policies oriented towards skilled workers should be encouraged as a means of fostering 
economic growth 
5 Immigration into [country] should be made more restrictive 
6 Immigrants from outside Europe should be required to accept our culture and values 
  
7 The legalisation of same sex marriages is a good thing 
8 Religious values and principles should be shown greater respect in politics 
9 The decriminalisation of the personal use of soft drugs is to be welcomed 
10 Euthanasia should be legalised 
  
11 Government spending should be reduced in order to lower taxes 
12 The EU should acquire its own tax-raising powers 
13 Governments should bail out failing banks with public money 
14 Governments should reduce workers' protection regulations in order to fight unemployment 
15 The EU should drastically reduce its subsidies to Europe's farmers 
  
16 Renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this means 
higher energy costs 
17 The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes (e.g. road taxing) 
18 Policies to fight global warming should be encouraged even if it hampers economic growth or 
employment 
  
19 Restrictions of civil liberties should be accepted in the fight against terrorism 
20 Criminals should be punished more severely 
  
21 On foreign policy issues, such as the relationship with Russia, the EU should speak with one voice 
22 The European Union should strengthen its security and defence policy 
23 European integration is a good thing 
24 [country] is much better off in the EU than outside it 
25 The European Union should be enlarged to include Turkey 
  
26 The European Parliament should be given more powers 
27 Individual member states of the EU should have less veto power 
28 Any new European Treaty should be subject to approval in a referendum in [country] 
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Table 2 - Number of: all respondents; strong party identifiers; respondents with a preferred party at various stages of imputation; respondents 
answering validly to all issues. Figures by area. 
    Preferred party imputation  
Area N originala N sampled   A A+B A+B+C A+B+C+D   
Valid 
answers 
on all 
issues 
Austria 13628 2000  591 1151 1523 1774  1664 
Belgium: Dutch-speaking electoral college 20353 2000  639 1151 1646 1819  1637 
Belgium: French-speaking electoral college 40861 2000  598 1161 1700 1864  1631 
Bulgaria 6319 2000  671 1142 1611 1820  1658 
Cyprus 1237 1237  558 871 1061 1149  988 
Czech Republic 7175 2000  611 1268 1699 1835  1585 
Denmark 2040 2040  569 1018 1484 1718  1576 
Estonia 1627 1627  433 845 1137 1383  1262 
Finland 5065 2000  675 1080 1540 1843  1588 
France 48853 2000  593 1012 1568 1841  1709 
Germany 98644 2000  485 1010 1649 1747  1643 
Greece 8926 2000  751 1271 1709 1904  1626 
Hungary 6622 2000  887 1371 1771 1903  1728 
Ireland 4845 2000  636 1154 1639 1835  1743 
Italy 51947 2000  571 1354 1765 1899  1657 
Latvia 974 974  226 486 721 871  771 
Lithuania 1836 1836  655 1027 1365 1606  1309 
Luxembourg (DE) 1019 1019  301 526 789 870  855 
Luxembourg (FR) 1411 1411  374 645 1013 1186  1200 
Luxembourg (LU) 555 555  152 270 393 471  424 
Malta 389 389  197 273 309 348  302 
Poland 31389 2000  810 1403 1833 1919  1578 
Portugal 80408 2000  645 1181 1622 1759  1645 
Romania 1678 1678  398 853 1177 1466  1431 
Slovakia 731 731  158 371 522 631  619 
Slovenia 1895 1895  587 983 1443 1634  1618 
Spain 24576 2000  711 1376 1765 1868  1711 
Sweden 225651 2000  562 1021 1525 1760  1300 
The Netherlands 194287 2000  357 883 1388 1688  1646 
UK: England 36957 2000  527 1045 1517 1821  1641 
UK: Northern Ireland 640 640  186 359 472 568  539 
UK: Scotland 3055 2000  634 1151 1643 1851  1622 
UK: Wales 732 732   262 437 578 666   618 
  926325 54764   17010 32494 45454 51637   44522 
          
a Only respondents who completed the test in more than 240 seconds.         
          
A: based on PTV, one party was ranked first with the maximum score (strong identifiers).       
B: based on PTV, one party was ranked first.          
C: when PTV tie between 2 parties, decided by computing predicted probabilities from a binary logistic model of preferred party in A, based on PTVs, distances, and other variables. 
D: when PTV missing, decided by computing predicted probabilities from a linear model of PTVs, based on distances and other variables.   
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Table 3 - Levels of agreement on issues in the 27 EU countries, listed by country size and geographical region. Values above 0.75 or below 0.25 
are highlighted. 
  keep welfare 
privatise 
healthcare 
increase 
creches 
attract 
skilled 
immigrants 
restrict 
immigration 
imgts 
accept 
values 
same sex 
marriages 
good 
more 
respect 
for 
religion 
legalise 
soft 
drugs 
legalise 
euthanasia 
reduce 
govt 
spending 
tax 
powers 
for EU 
bail 
out 
banks 
reduce 
workers' 
protection 
reduce 
EU 
farmers' 
subsidies 
Germany 0.66 0.36 0.77 0.58 0.61 0.89 0.69 0.34 0.42 0.64 0.70 0.20 0.31 0.37 0.67 
France 0.74 0.19 0.76 0.50 0.44 0.57 0.66 0.25 0.45 0.74 0.53 0.56 0.35 0.22 0.49 
UK 0.56 0.32 0.53 0.72 0.62 0.74 0.69 0.36 0.52 0.65 0.59 0.23 0.39 0.36 0.69 
Italy 0.63 0.32 0.82 0.74 0.67 0.71 0.49 0.44 0.43 0.66 0.72 0.61 0.30 0.43 0.43 
Spain 0.67 0.27 0.77 0.73 0.58 0.73 0.65 0.25 0.49 0.68 0.55 0.56 0.29 0.36 0.41 
                
Poland 0.47 0.62 0.68 0.69 0.41 0.61 0.33 0.37 0.43 0.50 0.71 0.42 0.21 0.39 0.42 
Romania 0.69 0.61 0.79 0.70 0.37 0.72 0.40 0.47 0.51 0.56 0.72 0.44 0.21 0.65 0.30 
Czech Republic 0.43 0.45 0.66 0.71 0.56 0.70 0.66 0.37 0.48 0.70 0.73 0.20 0.27 0.45 0.53 
Hungary 0.38 0.34 0.81 0.38 0.61 0.91 0.26 0.64 0.30 0.55 0.90 0.40 0.20 0.35 0.30 
Bulgaria 0.51 0.50 0.90 0.46 0.62 0.55 0.36 0.65 0.30 0.65 0.79 0.38 0.21 0.30 0.17 
                
The Netherlands 0.70 0.26 0.37 0.55 0.70 0.84 0.81 0.39 0.58 0.89 0.59 0.20 0.59 0.50 0.61 
Belgium 0.65 0.24 0.70 0.57 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.34 0.40 0.89 0.71 0.44 0.43 0.39 0.46 
Ireland 0.65 0.35 0.56 0.73 0.58 0.66 0.69 0.31 0.47 0.56 0.54 0.28 0.34 0.35 0.54 
Portugal 0.66 0.32 0.86 0.76 0.63 0.55 0.53 0.48 0.50 0.73 0.80 0.20 0.19 0.35 0.31 
Greece 0.80 0.33 0.94 0.54 0.70 0.62 0.47 0.53 0.49 0.60 0.78 0.43 0.26 0.40 0.29 
                
Finland 0.72 0.41 0.56 0.73 0.50 0.83 0.68 0.25 0.43 0.67 0.48 0.28 0.39 0.40 0.52 
Sweden 0.61 0.35 0.79 0.69 0.53 0.71 0.72 0.23 0.22 0.65 0.52 0.24 0.40 0.42 0.68 
Denmark 0.69 0.31 0.60 0.75 0.42 0.71 0.82 0.31 0.51 0.69 0.43 0.27 0.50 0.38 0.75 
Austria 0.68 0.29 0.72 0.63 0.62 0.87 0.64 0.33 0.44 0.63 0.68 0.31 0.41 0.33 0.55 
                
Estonia 0.66 0.30 0.75 0.48 0.44 0.80 0.48 0.33 0.34 0.70 0.75 0.48 0.22 0.28 0.39 
Latvia 0.66 0.39 0.79 0.71 0.48 0.77 0.45 0.21 0.46 0.69 0.72 0.37 0.34 0.38 0.45 
Lithuania 0.62 0.37 0.74 0.64 0.60 0.73 0.31 0.51 0.25 0.67 0.85 0.41 0.28 0.31 0.46 
Slovakia 0.44 0.43 0.71 0.64 0.44 0.68 0.49 0.33 0.49 0.57 0.69 0.30 0.24 0.36 0.52 
Slovenia 0.78 0.27 0.75 0.71 0.56 0.72 0.60 0.29 0.50 0.63 0.82 0.41 0.37 0.32 0.54 
                
Luxembourg 0.76 0.22 0.69 0.67 0.46 0.74 0.73 0.27 0.49 0.77 0.53 0.32 0.43 0.31 0.50 
Cyprus 0.80 0.41 0.89 0.68 0.61 0.62 0.54 0.43 0.51 0.61 0.58 0.40 0.33 0.49 0.40 
Malta 0.66 0.32 0.79 0.52 0.80 0.78 0.45 0.51 0.44 0.45 0.65 0.35 0.48 0.27 0.46 
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Table 4 - Levels of agreement on issues in the 27 EU countries, listed by country size and geographical region (continued). Values above 0.75 or 
below 0.25 are highlighted. 
 
  
support 
renewable 
sources 
promote 
public 
transport 
fight 
global 
warming 
restrict 
civil 
liberties 
more severe 
punishments 
EU 
one 
voice 
strengthen 
EU defence 
EU 
integration 
good 
country 
better in 
the EU 
enlarge 
EU to 
Turkey 
more 
powers 
to EP 
less veto 
power for 
EU states 
referendum 
for new 
treaties 
Germany 0.73 0.50 0.57 0.28 0.70 0.78 0.65 0.78 0.83 0.23 0.53 0.63 0.58 
France 0.81 0.79 0.73 0.33 0.53 0.82 0.69 0.81 0.85 0.40 0.76 0.76 0.63 
UK 0.70 0.58 0.54 0.29 0.70 0.54 0.53 0.60 0.62 0.43 0.33 0.41 0.76 
Italy 0.80 0.60 0.55 0.45 0.87 0.87 0.83 0.88 0.87 0.40 0.76 0.72 0.44 
Spain 0.75 0.58 0.57 0.37 0.79 0.84 0.79 0.90 0.92 0.44 0.72 0.72 0.68 
              
Poland 0.66 0.37 0.41 0.44 0.81 0.90 0.80 0.86 0.85 0.44 0.50 0.45 0.53 
Romania 0.87 0.73 0.70 0.30 0.79 0.86 0.80 0.83 0.83 0.54 0.69 0.55 0.58 
Czech Republic 0.49 0.69 0.41 0.43 0.84 0.83 0.70 0.75 0.85 0.34 0.42 0.41 0.54 
Hungary 0.85 0.57 0.72 0.38 0.87 0.79 0.77 0.70 0.69 0.38 0.51 0.59 0.44 
Bulgaria 0.73 0.72 0.69 0.46 0.91 0.80 0.77 0.87 0.76 0.34 0.67 0.53 0.65 
              
The Netherlands 0.72 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.82 0.79 0.61 0.70 0.76 0.31 0.42 0.63 0.52 
Belgium 0.74 0.60 0.59 0.41 0.79 0.89 0.73 0.83 0.88 0.32 0.71 0.82 0.54 
Ireland 0.74 0.62 0.51 0.32 0.78 0.69 0.60 0.81 0.90 0.41 0.48 0.42 0.76 
Portugal 0.91 0.80 0.74 0.43 0.86 0.84 0.81 0.88 0.88 0.55 0.59 0.54 0.67 
Greece 0.88 0.70 0.86 0.26 0.67 0.74 0.70 0.79 0.88 0.23 0.74 0.34 0.66 
              
Finland 0.76 0.66 0.66 0.30 0.67 0.73 0.67 0.83 0.84 0.34 0.52 0.63 0.49 
Sweden 0.81 0.69 0.71 0.45 0.69 0.64 0.60 0.72 0.64 0.38 0.35 0.55 0.49 
Denmark 0.85 0.75 0.68 0.31 0.60 0.71 0.66 0.76 0.78 0.42 0.50 0.54 0.62 
Austria 0.80 0.59 0.57 0.24 0.64 0.83 0.67 0.74 0.78 0.22 0.57 0.49 0.53 
              
Estonia 0.70 0.61 0.48 0.35 0.74 0.79 0.75 0.75 0.86 0.36 0.51 0.49 0.54 
Latvia 0.66 0.73 0.50 0.24 0.71 0.77 0.73 0.78 0.70 0.38 0.54 0.59 0.46 
Lithuania 0.79 0.65 0.57 0.49 0.80 0.87 0.80 0.87 0.87 0.36 0.59 0.50 0.51 
Slovakia 0.71 0.74 0.58 0.28 0.75 0.78 0.70 0.85 0.90 0.33 0.56 0.46 0.55 
Slovenia 0.79 0.82 0.71 0.27 0.78 0.78 0.65 0.83 0.87 0.38 0.69 0.59 0.45 
              
Luxembourg 0.81 0.66 0.64 0.31 0.63 0.87 0.67 0.85 0.88 0.31 0.61 0.54 0.56 
Cyprus 0.89 0.78 0.85 0.24 0.67 0.73 0.73 0.83 0.86 0.38 0.78 0.41 0.60 
Malta 0.75 0.58 0.59 0.52 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.77 0.34 0.59 0.43 0.65 
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Proofs 
1) Minimum and maximum values of differential support 
If we express support for the rightist party as p, support for the issue as i, and observed frequency in 
the top right cell as f (all expressed as proportions on the whole electorate), in Section 2 it was shown 
that max(f) = min(i, p); min(f) = max(0, i – (1 – p)). 
Also, let use define differential support as d = f – i*p. This is because the differential support is 
precisely the difference between the observed frequency f and the expected frequency i*p (all of them 
being expressed in shares on the whole sample). 
Thus, in order to derive functions expressing the maximum and minimum possible values for d, we 
will have to take into account the analogous constraints for f, which require us to consider different 
cases. In particular: 
 
max(d) = max (f) – ip = min(i, p) – ip  
⇒ max(d) =  i – ip   [when i ≤ p]  
  p – ip   [when i > p]  
And: 
min(d) = min (f) – ip = max(0, i – (1 – p)) - ip 
⇒ min(d) =  0 – ip   [when i – (1 – p) ≤ 0]  
  i – (1 – p) – ip  [when i – (1 – p) > 0]  
In the AP diagram, the x axis represents d, and the y axis represents i. Thus, if we want to obtain the 
equations representing the coordinates of max(d) and min(d), we can substitute, in the above 
equations, max(d) with x, and i with y, obtaining: 
For max(d): 
 
x = y – yp [when y ≤ p]  y(1 – p) = x  y = x / (1 – p)  [when y ≤ p] 
x = p – yp [when y > p]  
⇒
yp = p – x 
⇒
y = 1 – x / p [when y > p] 
For min(d): 
 
x = 0 – yp        [when y ≤ 1 – p] yp = –x  y = – x / p 
x = y – (1 – p) – yp [when y > 1 – p] 
⇒
y(1 – p) –  (1 – p) = x 
⇒ 
y = x/(1 – p) + 1 
2) Derivation of issue yield 
Let us define p as the share of respondents that support a party, i the share of respondents that agrees 
on an issue, and f the share of respondents that support the party and agree on the issue. 
Then, the coordinates of the party will be: x = p – p2 ; y = p. And the coordinates of the issue will be x 
= f – p*i ; y = i (see proof 1). 
Given two points, the slope of the line connecting them is simply (y1 – y0)  / (x1 – x0). Thus, the 
slope of the line connecting the party and the issue will be 
))1(( ippf
pi
+−+
−
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But the maximum possible slope (in the top right corner) is (–1 / p). If we divide the actual slope by 
the maximum possible slope, we obtain 
))1((
)(
ippf
ipp
+−+
−
 
which can reach a maximum of 1, when an issue lies on the boundary path, and will be 0 when a party 
moves towards an issue that has the same level of support, but with a loss of some of its original 
voters. 
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